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Abstract. In this article I propose a theological reflection on the philosophical as-
sumptions behind the idea that intelligent machine can be governed through ethical 
protocols, which may apply either to the people who develop the machines or to the 
machines themselves, or both. This idea is particularly relevant in the case of machines’ 
extreme wrongdoing, a wrongdoing that becomes an existential risk for humankind. 
I call this extreme wrong-doing, ‘evil.’ Thus, this article is a theological account on the 
philosophical assumptions behind the possibility of evil machines, machines that can 
create an existential risk for humankind, and the ethical remedies that limit that risk. 
After discussing these assumptions, I argue for the ineffectiveness of these ethical 
remedies to prevent the possibility of evil machines. The article is an application of 
Romano Guardini’s thought on technology to evil machines. 
Keywords: evil; technology; AI; ethics.
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Introduction
One of the most famous and persistent myths of our time is the intelligent 
machine turning evil. In this article I define ‘intelligent machine’ in terms 
of sentient machines with general artificial intelligence (‘AI’) and ‘evil’ as 
extreme wrongdoing, a wrongdoing that becomes an existential risk for 
humankind. Thus, evil machines are machines that can create an existential 
risk for humankind. The possibility of evil machines (defined as above) 
has already been considered in the current scholarship. In his renowned 
book Life 3.0. Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, for example, 
MIT physicist Max Tegmark lists twelve scenarios regarding the lasting 
trajectory of Artificial Intelligence (AI). At least three of these scenarios 
assume a form of AI turned evil (to be fair, Tegmark rejects the idea of evil 
machine and prefer to consider the case of ‘misaligned intelligence,’ i.e., 
intelligence with goals misaligned with human goals). In ‘conquerors,’ AI 
takes control and gets rid of humankind. In ‘descendants,’ the result is the 
same, but the end is more graciously delivered. In ‘zookeepers,’ humans 
survive only to live in a cage (Tegmark 2017, 162–163). At the same time, 
scholars and practitioners are confident that the possibility of evil machines 
is avoidable through a strategy of containment, ethical limits that operate 
as unsurmountable deterrents to would-be evil-doers. These ethical limits 
should work on people (the designers and developers of machine) as well 
as on machines. The idea is that some ethical limits prevent intelligent 
machines from ignoring certain software modules that instruct them to 
maintain the norms of behavior that have been programmed into them. 
These ethical limits also prevent developers from allowing intelligent ma-
chines to ignore those software modules. In sum, scholarship addresses the 
problem of evil machines in terms of ethical remedies, that is, protocols that 
guide people dealing with the machines as well as the machines themselves 
and work as a rationale that restrains their use and guide the appropriate 
exercise of such power. 
In this article I study the idea that ethics governs intelligent machines. 
I look at this idea theologically through the lens of the work of German 
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theologian Romano Guardini, including The End of the Modern World (1998) 
and Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race 
(1994). While his writings were originally published more than half a century 
ago, the relevance of Guardini’s work on technology in the development of 
Catholic thought has been recently confirmed by Pope Francis (2015). Once 
placed into Guardini’s framework, this idea that ethics governs intelligent 
machines reveals itself to be based on an assumption, that is, ethos is sub-
ordinated to logos. Ethos and logos are philosophical categories; they stand 
respectively for the embodiment of ideas in social practice (ethos) and the 
rationale behind practice (logos). Synonyms of ethos are action, practice, 
will, and power; synonyms of logos are theory, knowledge, logic, and reason. 
Guardini discussed the relationship between logos and ethos within a much 
larger theme, i.e., the transformation of culture from modernity to late (or 
after-) modernity (Millare 2013) In a nutshell, Guardini sees after-modernity 
as absolute modernity, in which technological action is a dominant force 
with no limits or counterparts. As a matter of fact, Guardini did not coin 
the expression ‘absolute modernity’ nor ever adopt it. Rather, it was a Swiss 
theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, who applied the sentence to summarize 
Guardini’s specific view of after-modernity (2010, 105). Methodologically 
speaking, this study is a loose application of Guardini’s claims about 
‘absolute modernity’ to the problem of evil technologies.
In this article I dispute theologically the prevention of the possibility 
of evil machine through ethical limits, regardless of whether the latter 
refers to people or machines. Put simply, I argue for the ineffectiveness of 
a containment strategy to prevent the risk of evil technologies, defending 
this position by applying a specific understanding of technological culture. 
In this specific understanding, technological culture is one of ubiquitous 
technological power. In such a culture, is it possible to seriously consider 
a self-imposed limit, an ethical boundary, an unsurmountable principle 
as effective? I believe the correct answer is no. In such a reality, in fact, 
ethical limits raised to prevent the risk and to deflect the impact of evil 
technologies are ineffective; therefore, technological search for power 
operates unchallenged. I elaborate on this contribution and claim that in 
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a situation of saturated technological culture, technological forces are free 
to be evil. To put if differently, I frame the possibility of evil as internal to 
the same forces that are establishing technology as a dominant factor in 
Western culture, so that no limit ever reveals itself as insurmountable. This 
is my argument.
Before proceeding further, I should define the scope of my article 
and clarify the terms used; I will also make explicit the limitations of my 
argument and the method adopted. In this article I propose a preliminary 
investigation on the condition of evil in a technological era. In this study, 
evil is defined as a force that causes human suffering and leaves no room for 
understanding or redemption. An evil technology, therefore, is a force that 
causes human suffering beyond understanding or redemption. As ‘condition 
of evil’ I mean the possibility to produce an action that is not simply morally 
wrong, but one that leaves no room for understanding or for redemption. 
I place this possibility neither in the machine nor the human in front or 
behind the machine, rather in the technological culture in which machines 
and humans operate. I define technology as a mathematically and logically 
driven form of techne, a term that stands for ‘practice’ or ‘activity.’ In this 
article, I consider technology in the same terms of philosopher Emanuele 
Severino, who, in the tradition of Heidegger, addresses technology as will of 
power (2016a and 2016b). Moreover, ‘evil technologies’ (or ‘evil machines’ 
synonymously) are technologies turned evil. ‘Evil machines’ stand for 
intelligent machines that possess the ability to make choices and therefore 
come with the capacity for evil. More precisely, these are machines that are 
free to either follow or ignore some software modules that instruct them 
to maintain the norms of behavior that have been programmed into them. 
‘Ethics’ is defined in Kantian terms, that is, in terms of application of rules 
and normative theories, or determination of right or wrong (i.e., good and 
evil), while moral imperative is about doing what is right. It is in the realm 
of this definition of ethics that my argument stands. In this study, I neither 
assert that the notion of evil in a technological culture is morally significant, 
nor do I elaborate a theory of evil in a technological culture. I simply argue 
that the notion of evil in a technological culture is practically significant, 
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with genuine theoretical interest. I do not deal with the question of the 
‘banality of evil,’ and therefore I do not consider the question of whether an 
action should be considered evil only if it is intentional, or, more precisely, 
malicious, sadistic, or defiant. Arendt (1963), Card (2002), and Formosa 
(2008) think that evil actions can be banal, in that evil actions do not require 
evil actors. Singer (2004), Kekes (2005), and Steiner (2002) contradict Arendt, 
and argue that an action can be evil only if it is intentional.
This is a three-part paper. In the first part, I draft the problem I aim 
to address in this essay. In the second, I explain Guardini’s thought on 
technology. In the third, I apply Guardini’s framework on technology to 
the problem of evil technologies. 
1. Problem
Broadly speaking, the recent debate over the effects of AI has been domi-
nated by three themes. One is the threat that AI will allow governments to 
monitor, understand, and control their citizens far more closely than ever 
before. Another theme is based on the worry that a new industrial revolu-
tion will allow machines to disrupt and replace humans in every—or almost 
every—area of society, from transportation to the military to healthcare. 
The third theme refers to the way in which AI promises to reshape the 
world: by exceeding human intelligence and escapes human control, with 
possibly disastrous consequences. This is the theme of the technological 
singularity, the notion – introduced by scholar and science fiction author 
Vernor Vinge in his 1993 essay The Coming Technological Singularity – that 
an upgradable intelligent technology would enter a ‘runaway reaction’ of 
self-improvement cycles, so that the intelligent technology would continue 
to upgrade itself and advance technologically at an incomprehensible rate 
with no control on human side. 
A less famous but still relevant variant on this theme is the so-called 
‘unfriendly AI,’ according to which the problem with the singularity is 
not the impossibility of human control over technology, but rather the 
lack of shared goals between intelligent technology and humanity. In this 
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perspective, the problem is not the increasing power of AI, but how this 
power is used. Tegmark is not only a physicist but also a co-founder of 
the Future of Life Institute (FLI). Among other reasons, FLI was created 
precisely to help humanity pursuing a ‘friendly AI,’ that is, an AI whose 
goals are aligned with humanity’s goals. In Tegmark’s view, the task for 
researchers, engineers, and programmers is making AI learn, adopt, and 
retain humanity’s goals (2017, 260). In this context, the way “to imbute 
a superintelligent AI with an ultimate goal that neither is undefined nor 
leads to the elimination of humanity,” Tegmark explains, passes through 
the development of an adequate forms of ethics (2017, 249–279 and 280). 
While Tegmark recognizes that an ethics for technological singularity is 
still to come, two forms of ethics have been developed to limit the effects 
of a pre-singularity AI self-empowerment. These two forms of ethics are: 
1. machine ethics (which is concerned with the moral behavior of artificial 
intelligence beings); and 2. roboethics (which is concerned with the moral 
behavior of humans as they design, construct, and use such beings). 
Scholarship on machine ethics is expanding (Wallach and Allen 2008; 
Lin and Abney 2011; Lin, Jenkins and Abney 2017). Recent literature in 
machine ethics has addressed the so-called ‘machine question,’ that is, 
whether a machine might be considered a legitimate moral agent that 
could be held responsible for decisions and actions (Gunkel 2012). At stake 
in this debate on machine morality is the acceptance of the machine as 
a moral agent, with the notion that future machines might be conscious and 
should be included in the moral order. On the side of robotics, the question 
surrounds that of ethical protocols embedded in the work of programmers 
and their software as the condition of friendly, non-evil technologies. To 
put it differently, roboethics assumes that the definition of right and wrong 
belongs to the people behind the machines, and machine ethics assumes 
that such a definition belongs to the machines themselves. Recent work in 
the field of robotics focuses on important ethical issues, including privacy 
concerns, responsibility and the delegation of decision making, transparency, 
bias as it arises at all stages of data science processes, and ethical practices 
that embed values in design and translate democratic values into practices 
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(Coeckelbergh 2020). Practitioners and researchers offer ways to transform 
modern ethical theory into practical guidelines for designers, product 
managers, and software engineers alike (Boddington 2017; Bowles 2018). In 
sum, most experts maintain the opinion that making AI safe for a specific 
purpose likely will be solved. Some scholars and scientists, however, show 
optimism for humans’ future with general AI, too. General AI refers to an 
algorithm or set of algorithms that can perform all tasks as well as or better 
than humans. Narrow AI is artificial intelligence that is focused on one 
narrow task. With changes of small or large magnitude, those experts believe 
that controlling ethics through AI is going to be possible, and that no unre-
stricted general AI will ever be released. Other experts are more concerned, 
however. Less optimistic contributions come from scholars involved in the 
‘control problem,’ a question posed by philosopher Nick Bostrom on how 
to limit advanced artificial intelligence while still benefiting from its use 
(Bostrom 2014, 127–144). Computer theorist Stuart Russell believes that 
AI, as it is developed currently, is on the path to becoming a mortal threat 
to humanity. His solution is to change the way AI is developed. Russell 
suggests that we can rebuild AI on a new foundation according to which 
machines are designed to be altruistic and committed to pursuing our 
objectives, not theirs. This new foundation, in Russell’s view, would allow 
us to create machines that are provably deferential and provably beneficial 
as machines (Russell 2019). As it is currently built, therefore, AI is a threat 
for humanity. Bostrom and Russell believe that if AI surpasses humanity 
in general intelligence to become superintelligent, then humanity will be 
at the mercy of that superintelligence goodwill. 
The problem in this article is neither that an adequate ethics for tech-
nological singularity has not developed yet, or whether such an adequate 
ethics may be developed, but rather whether any form of ethics is capable 
to limit, govern, or control intelligent technology in the long run. To put 
it differently, the problem addressed in this article is whether ethics is an 
effective condition to ‘imbute,’ i.e., govern, control, limit, a superintelligent 
AI. A situation where a superintelligence AI is free to pursue its goals 
without limits and constrains, in fact, is a necessary condition that make 
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evil possible. The argument of this article is that any strategy that operates 
on the assumption that ethics governs general AI (before and especially 
after reaching the stage of superintelligence) is going to fail. Programmers 
will secure AI and make it safe, but no one can prevent someone else from 
modifying it so that those safeguards are altered. By ‘someone else’ I mean 
(1) humans who use AI against other humans on a massive scale, and/or (2) 
AI which subverts the human’s control and gets free. Once the first unre-
stricted general AI is released, there will be no effective means of stopping 
its distribution and use. In dealing with the ‘singularity,’ the event in which 
a machine superintelligence (or simply ‘superintelligence’) exceeds human 
intelligence and escapes human control, several scientists, engineers, and 
scholars have been adamantly clear: the possibility of disastrous conse-
quences is high. The debate is most often framed in the following way: we 
do not stop the progress of AI, yet we know it can cause nothing short of the 
annihilation of humanity. Bostrom popularizes the concept of ‘existential 
risk,’ which is the idea that superintelligence, no longer under human control, 
can put at risk the very existence of mankind (2002 and 2014). In the entire 
debate, however, there is no room for evil. Evil is replaced specifically by the 
notion of ‘misaligned machine intelligence,’ i.e., machine intelligence with 
goals misaligned with human goals (Tegmark 2017, 162–163). The task for 
researchers, engineers, and programmers is making machine intelligence 
learn, adopt, and retain humanity’s goals (2017, 260). The way “to imbute 
a superintelligent AI with an ultimate goal that neither is undefined nor leads 
to the elimination of humanity,” in the words of Tegmark, passes through 
the development of adequate forms of ethics (2017, 280).
Evil is not a popular topic. Scholars prefer to deal with wrongdoing. 
Evil-skeptics insist that morality demands that humans abandon the concept 
of evil. Evil-revivalists, however, insists that the concept of evil should be 
revived– that morality demands that humans make evil intelligible. In this 
paper I take a realistic stand, and I assume that evil exists in the same way 
that goodness, malice, or honesty exist. I have reason to believe that there 
really are evil actions, the worst kind of wrong actions, actions beyond 
redemption. With this qualification in mind, there is no room in this article 
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for trivial evils, or excusable evils, or evil actions that people morally ought 
to perform (Calder 2015 and Steiner 2002). That said, the notion of evil 
action is vague, ambiguous, and in need of clarification. Talk about evil 
should be done cautiously, for good pragmatic reasons, and claims that 
certain actions are evil should be clarified. So, what is evil? In Evil in Modern 
Thought, Susan Neiman frames the distinction between moral and natural 
evil as an “eighteenth century’s use of the word evil to refer to both acts of 
human cruelty and instances of human suffering” (2002, 3). The first form 
of evil is moral and is intrinsic to human nature (i.e., human cruelty); the 
second is natural and extrinsic to humanity (i.e., human suffering). In the 
last two centuries, philosophical reflection focused on the first form, leaving 
the second to the attention of science. 
First in science fiction literature, then in science, philosophy, and tech-
nology studies, readers have been accustomed to address evil in technology 
as a case of character trait or moral property of actions (Russell 2014). With 
regard to the former, scholars seems to have different ideas on where evil 
should be actually located: in the machines or in the humans standing in 
front (users, clients) or operating behind (programmers, engineers) the 
machine (Martin 2019; Sparrow 2007; Sparrow 2016; Arkin 2009). Those 
who believe that technology is inherently neutral or value-free see evil in 
terms of human cruelty; those who believe instead that technologies have 
politics, that is, technological objects and systems have political qualities 
for they “embody specific forms of power and authority” (Winner 1986, 19), 
investigate the possibility of technologies as intrinsically evil. Scholars also 
differ with reference to the primacy of character trait over moral property of 
actions, or the other way around. Russell (2014, 31) claims that we ought to 
build an account of evil character on a prior account of evil action; Haybron 
(2002, 280) and Singer (2004, 190) argue for the contrary view of beginning 
with an account of evil character. Other authors reject the option of evil 
machines and argue that the option reflects cultural anxieties about robots; 
these scholars prefer to direct their attention to the human perception 
of evil machines (machines that are perceived evil) (Szollosy 2017). Not 
surprisingly, some simply refuse to use the word ‘evil’ because of what they 
9(1)/2021266
E N R I CO B E LT RA M I N I
see as its religious connotations. Others use the word ‘evil’ but make clear 
that it does not come with religious connotations (Martin 2019, 1). 
In conclusion, in this article, to say a technology is evil is to say it (i.e., 
general AI before or after the singularity) puts at risk the very existence of 
mankind. Accordingly, the problem I like to address here can be summarized 
as follows: can an ethical limit be seriously considered as a concrete, practical 
remedy for the existential risk hypothetically presented to humanity by 
the singularity? 
In the next two parts, the attention moves from AI in particular to 
technology in general, as the discourse is addressed in general terms with 
regard to Guardini’s thought on the culture of technology. As it will become 
clear at the end of the next section, Guardini’s reflection can be organized in 
a framework. In the second part, I apply Guardini’s thought to the problem 
of evil technologies. 
2. Guardini’s Thought on Technology
Across the last century, Roman Catholicism has attempted to come to terms 
with technology. The result of this effort can be summarized in the work 
of two thinkers, German theologian-philosopher Romano Guardini and 
French theologian-sociologist Jacques Ellul. Both share the same premises, 
that is, the technological has replaced nature as the milieu in which human 
beings are required to exist (Guardini 1994, 13; Ellul 1983, 86). They reach, 
however, opposite conclusions: Guardini believes that technology should be 
evangelized, that is, assimilated into the Christian worldview; Ellul argued 
that technology should be challenged and rejected. Recently, Pope Francis 
mentioned Guardini several times in one of his most important official 
documents, de facto giving credibility and authority to Guardini’s position. 
To be honest, Guardini never really offered a solution to the problem of the 
assimilation of technology into the Christian worldview; he rather articulated 
an analysis of the nature of technology as a cultural phenomenon in the 
same line as the work of other German philosophers of his day: Karl Jaspers 
(1931), Oswald Spengler (1931), Ernst Cassirer (1985), Martin Heidegger 
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(1962), and Jürgen Habermas (1968). To understand Guardini’s thought of 
technology as a cultural phenomenon, one must start from Guardini’s view 
of the passage of Western civilization from modernity to absolute modernity. 
In Guardini’s view, modernity is the condition of the modern world. 
Here modernity (a word first coined by Charles Baudelaire in 1864) is 
not examined through just a philosophical lens but includes the cultural 
embodied elements. Modernity is a philosophy as well as an entire cultural 
package, with a complete array of philosophical and scientific foundations 
affecting every aspect of life, including arts, politics, economy, and society. 
In a nutshell, modernity is a multi-layer condition and, as such, it offers 
a vision of synthetic totality as a comprehensive structure of meaning. 
According to Guardini, modernity is gradually replaced by a more radical form 
of modernity, i.e., absolute modernity. The expression ‘absolute modernity’ 
refers to Arthur Rimbaud’s Une saison en enfer, where he states that “one 
must be absolutely modern” (“il faut être absolument modern”) (1979, 116). 
Being absolutely modern is being modern in an absolute way, the latter 
understood by Rimbaud as the condition of those who have been made free 
and have broken loose from any previous bond with the past. With ‘absolute 
modernity,’ Guardini means a world that is absolutely modern—modern to 
an absolute degree. If modernity is the condition in which the human has 
been severed from nature, absolutized modernity is the world in which the 
‘natural’ has been replaced by the artificial. The end of the modern world is 
the entering of humanity into a world in which everything is merely factual, 
everything including human existence. 
Being modern in an absolute way is understood by Guardini as the 
condition of those who have been made free and have broken loose from any 
previous bond with nature. Ultimately, in a condition of absolute modernity, 
the world is artificial, that is, the inner reality of the world is filled with 
norms and necessities, but at the same time there is nothing that could 
not be different. All things and souls fly in the void like travelers in space 
without any possibility of ground control. In Guardini’s words, “I am who 
I am not by nature; rather, I am ‘given’ to myself” (1993, 14ff). “I am given” 
can probably be paraphrased as: I am an object among other objects that 
9(1)/2021268
E N R I CO B E LT RA M I N I
can be thrown with complete indifference into a cosmos operating as a mere 
space. A robust sense of contingency lies in that assertion. In sum, the world 
is not by nature, it is given. And Man is not by nature. For Guardini, the 
passage from modernity to absolute modernity is a transformation of culture 
– a transformation from a scientific culture to a technological culture. Here 
‘culture’ stands for Weltanschauung, the fundamental cognitive orientation 
of world perception. A scientific culture is a culture in which the world is 
perceived through a scientific lens; analogously, a technological culture is 
a culture in which the world is perceived through a technological lens. The 
crucial point is how the transformation occurs. The shift from modernity to 
absolute modernity, in Guardini’s opinion, is the transformation of culture 
through the re-articulation of the relationship between ethos and logos. 
Guardini claims that the primate of logos over ethos, encapsulated by the 
Scholastic axiom ‘action follows being’ (ager esequiter esse), then adopted 
in modernity with a slight adjustment, i.e., ‘action follows knowledge,’ has 
reached a dead end. In a technological culture, ethos drives logos. Thus, the 
movement consists in a passage from a scientific world-view with logos as 
the center of gravity, to a technological world-view centered on ethos. 
For Guardini, the passage from modernity to absolute modernity is the 
shifting from scientific culture to technological culture. The crucial point 
is how the transformation occurs. In the following four sections, I address 
the question of the transformation of culture through the re-articulation of 
the relationship between ethos and logos. In particular, the movement from 
a scientific world-view with logos as the center of gravity to a technological 
world-view centered on ethos is considered. Thus, in the next sections 
a trajectory within the transformation of culture, from a culture centered on 
scientific knowledge to another centered on technological action, is designed. 
While in the previous part of the article I mentioned Guardini’s emphasis on 
the artificial – counterpointed to natural – character of technology, in this 
and the next parts I focus on Guardini’s identification of technology with 
power. Guardini focuses on technology as power in Power and Responsibility: 
A Course of Action for the New Age. While End of the Modern World and Power 
and Responsibility were originally translated into English and published 
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by Regenery Press as two separate works, ISI Books has published them 
together in one volume.
2.1. Logos and Ethos in a Scientific Culture
In this section, the relationship between logos (theory) and ethos (practice) 
in scientific culture is briefly described. Two different relationships between 
theory and practice in scientific culture are examined through the prism 
of the relationship between logos and ethos in the reality of modernity. In 
particular, the question of the primacy of logos over ethos, and its reversal, 
the primacy of ethos over logos, is addressed. Let’s start with the former, 
that is, the subordination of the ethos over the logos, of will over the 
knowledge. The subordination of the ethos over the logos means that every 
ethos always needs a logos to precede it and give it meaning. Its reversal 
is the subordination of the logos over the ethos, of knowledge over will. As 
a result of this emphasis on superiority of the will (voluntarism), ethos has 
received a primacy over logos, the practice over theory. In other words, the 
subordination of the logos over the ethos proclaims the superiority of the 
utility and the pragmatism of the will over knowledge and meaning. In sum, 
the first option (the primacy of logos) supports the primacy of scientific 
method and theoretical inquiry; the second (the primacy of ethos) supports 
the primacy of utility and pragmatism. In a scientific culture, logos maintains 
a dominant position over ethos. 
2.2. From Scientific Logos to Technological Logos
The passage from modernity to absolute modernity, i.e., from a scientific 
culture to a technological culture, is a complex movement. The first step 
is the shift from a scientific logos (a logos within a scientific culture) to 
a technological logos (a logos within a technological culture). Readers may 
be aware that there are different types of  logos. The case considered is 
that culture is transforming, moving from a culture centered on scientific 
knowledge to one centered on technological knowledge. This passage to 
a technological logos means that, in this era, technological rationality 
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replaces scientific rationality. More precisely, a distinct way of reasoning, 
a form of calculative thinking, a calculative logos replaces a scientific, 
utilitarian logos. Technology has by now become the most powerful form 
of organization of knowledge and transformation of the world. 
2.3. From Scientific Ethos to Technological Ethos
The first step is the shift from a scientific logos (a logos within a scientific 
culture) to a technological logos (a logos within a technological culture). 
However, the passage from a scientific culture to a technological culture 
involves the logos as well as the ethos. More precisely, the passage from one 
logos to another implies a change from one ethos to another. Readers may be 
aware that there are different types of ethos. In practice, the ethos changes as 
a result of the related logos. This is particularly true in the case of a passage to 
a technological logos. The ethos of science is governed by a utilitarian logos; 
the ethos of technological progress is governed by a calculative logos. Thus, 
the logos of techne, a calculative way of thinking, theorizing, and judging, 
orients and dominates over an ethos of technological power.
2.4. From the Logos-Ethos Relation to the Ethos-Logos Relation 
I complete the description of the transformation with further comments 
on the relationship between ethos and logos in a technological culture. 
In this section of the paper, I recognize that a technological culture has 
subordinated logos to ethos. This subordination can be described as the 
dominance of doing (ethos) over knowing (logos). What ultimately matters 
is not knowledge, but activity. As result of the nominalist emphasis on 
superiority of the will in technological culture, ethos has received a primacy 
over logos. No matter how great the quality of knowledge, the brilliance 
of theory, what really matters is the energy of the volition and ultimately 
action. In the end, a technological logos is subordinated to a technological 
ethos, that is, an ethos of a technological culture that is all about power and 
driven by a thirst for unstoppable technological progress. 
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2.5. Science-Technology Relationship
The passage from a scientific to a technological culture changes the rela-
tionship between science and technology. In a scientific culture, technology 
is a means to increase scientific knowledge. In a technological culture, 
technology is a goal of its own. Thus, the passage from a scientific to 
a technological culture can be understood as an erosion of ends by means. 
Science must strengthen the technological means of which it makes use, but 
in so doing, science empowers technology and transform it in a goal. To put 
it differently, technology is a means that becomes necessary for increasing 
the power of science; because it is necessary for increasing the power of 
science, it is no longer a means, but rather a goal in itself. In a technological 
culture, technology is no longer the handmaid of the scientific forces that 
govern the world but is itself the power that governs the destinies of these 
scientific forces. The tendency of our time is that science is asked to serve 
the ideology of technological advancement, not the other way around: 
modern science tends to depend on technological knowledge. 
2.6. In Summary
A common belief in these days is the primacy of knowledge over action and 
science over technology. Technology is a sub product of scientific knowledge, 
or, in the terms used above, a technological ethos is subordinated to a scien-
tific logos. The notion of culture transformation helps make clear that the 
relationship between logos and ethos operates within the same culture or 
paradigm. Thus, the transformation from the scientific to the technological 
is more precisely a shift with a dominant scientific logos to a similarly 
dominant technological ethos, or more simply, from scientific knowledge 
to technological action. This shift from the primacy of scientific rationale to 
technological power implies that an ethos (action) of technological power, 
without a logos that precedes it and gives it meaning, is free to produce an 
action that is independent from knowledge. This topic is addressed in the 
next part of the study. 
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3. Application to the Problem of Evil Machines 
For Guardini, the modern world is replaced by a world that is even more 
modern – modern in absolute terms. The movement from the modern world 
to the absolute modern world, or from a scientific culture to a technological 
culture, is the passage from a form of scientific rationality to a configuration 
of technological action. In the next two sections, I elaborate on the results of 
Guardini’s reflection on technology: first, I take a closer look at technological 
culture. I understand technological culture as absolute becoming. Second, 
I identify technology as will and address evil in technological culture in 
terms of unlimited power. Finally, I return to the problem of AI and ethics’ 
role in controlling it.
3.1. Technology in Technological Culture 
What is an action that is independent from knowledge? In a nutshell, it 
means that everything is transient, ephemeral, and destined to decay. It 
means that everything is controvertible, deniable, and disputable. It means 
that action cannot be governed, therefore it cannot be constrained or 
limited. It means the triumph of becoming on being and the impossibility 
of rationalizing the logic of becoming. 
The becoming, the notion that everything is (happens) in time, has been 
known to the citizens of the West living in the humanistic and scientific 
eras. The becoming is that nothing stays forever. Faced with the anguish of 
‘becoming,’ the West responded in the past through the logic of the remedy, 
i.e., it raised the ‘immutables’ (God, the laws of nature, dialectics, the free 
market, the ethical or political laws, etc.). The immutables are entities (God, 
the divine laws, the laws of nature) and transcendental and permanent values 
(ethical, natural, etc.). The task of the immutables is to limit, constrain, and 
ultimately control the becoming. In the pre-scientific tradition, structures 
of the world were eternal and permanent, God was necessary and so were 
the king and the pope. Providence governed the world of people. Science 
came to light claiming that eternal laws, such as the law of gravity, regulate 
the universe, where time and space are absolute entities independent from 
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events and Man. States have tried to control becoming through laws and 
soldiers, religions through God and the supernatural, philosophy through 
logic and spirit of criticism. All in all, the immutables stand on their ne-
cessity: to be effective in their task to constrain and control the becoming, 
the immutable need to be necessary. 
The essential substratum of the philosophy of the last two centuries has 
made crystal clear that the only possible necessity is the becoming. Today, 
there lies the persuasion that every thing is contingent. This persuasion, in 
turn, is founded on the central trait of the philosophical thought of our time– 
the thought that no ‘thing’ exists by necessity. Here ‘thing’ is understood in 
its broader sense – the one in which, for example, a ‘thing’ is an animal, an 
intellectual state, a concept. Divine things exist by necessity, but not because 
there are things, but rather because there are divine (above the contingency 
of life). But divine things, of course, cannot exist. Non-divine things, however, 
insofar that they are things, do not exist by necessity. This implies the power 
to imagine a time in which these things that are, will be no longer. It also 
implies the power to imagine a time in which these things that are not, will 
be. In other words, by linking things to a ‘when,’ to a time, things that are 
something becomes nothing, and things that are nothing become something. 
In the realm of becoming, all comes and goes. In the realm of becoming, being 
has a birth (conceived as beginning to be by emerging from nothingness) and 
death (conceived as the end of being). In the realm of becoming, there is no 
contradiction in having a being that is not (i.e., an entity that is nothing). 
This oscillation of things between being and nothing (or non-being) is the 
contingent condition of things, their condition of non-necessity. 
An example in which to think about a being that is not, is not contradic-
tory, is historiography. The past is no longer. Insofar as it is past, this day is 
not and has become past. The past is no longer and, as such, it is non-being, 
nothingness. Yet, the past ‘is.’ Historians refer to the past that remains in 
the traces that it has left. Properly speaking, what remains in the traces 
is not the past, rather something that remains. The past does not remain. 
But, again, in historiography there is no contradiction in thinking a being 
that is not. What we have here is a non-absolute being combined with 
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a non-absolute non-being—a non-necessary something with a no-necessary 
nothing. When it comes to things in time, the principle of non-contradic-
tion seems not to function: it is possible to think an entity that does not 
exist. And it is possible because it is an unquestionable evidence that a thing 
becomes: there is a time when it is and a time when it is not. It is absolutely 
evident that things are in becoming, that is, they are born, exist, and then 
die. In other words, the being itself is ephemeral, is contingent, that is, the 
world is seen as existing by chance; reality has no foundation. A world of 
non-necessity is a contingent world. It means that the philosophy of our 
times has shown that nothing else, God, immutable, or eternal, is necessary. 
Everything is contingent. Every truth, knowledge, law or principle, value or 
faith, is destined to perish, replaceable, and ultimately unnecessary. But if 
the immutables are temporary and contingent, how can they control the 
becoming? How can they limit and constrain and ultimately govern the 
becoming when the becoming is permanent and necessary? As a matter 
of fact, their destiny is to become, i.e., to change, and therefore to be an 
integral part of the unstoppable becoming. 
Both the humanist and scientific cultures share the same will, the will to 
know permanently the truth of the world. In the humanist culture, knowledge 
is produced by philosophy; in a scientific culture, knowledge is produced 
by science, while philosophy tends to sink into scientific knowledge. The 
entire body of philosophy dissolves into single sciences: psychology, logic, 
political science. What had been the function of philosophy in the humanistic 
culture has been inherited by the sciences. Both the humanist and scientific 
culture raise the immutables because they both inherit the traits of stability 
from the episteme. The episteme, or the structure of understanding, is the 
condition that makes knowledge possible (from episteme derives the term 
epistemology). It is the native essence of philosophy and science, an essence 
that lies beyond the ‘immutables.’ The episteme is the stable dimension of 
knowledge, within which are raised all the immutables of the West. 
As said, episteme is the word with which philosophy expresses the abso-
lute character of truth in the ancient world. More precisely, episteme means 
the staying (what is staying) despite the becoming (what is becoming). The 
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episteme, which imposes itself on the becoming, ultimately suffocates be-
coming; thus, it is necessary that, in order for becoming to be, that episteme 
becomes impermanent (it is no longer episteme in the proper sense). Think, 
for example, of the sense given to the ‘things,’ which is in fact not constant, 
but according to historical epochs. It is a world in which no episteme (i.e., 
knowledge, theory, science) is permanent, in which no stable structures of 
knowledge are possible. The point is, the technological culture does not 
inherit the traits of episteme, rather of techne, a practice. According to 
a technological mentality, consequently, theory is not the model of action 
and therefore of creation. Creation is action without a preliminary model. In 
the same spirit, reality in a technological culture is not shaped by the form, 
and action is not the fruit of thought, nor the work of a precedent model. 
Reason is not (the only) guide of human behavior nor of the reality. Thought 
does not govern being, and knowledge does not precede practice. The tech-
nological culture is the very negation and destruction of the immutables.
Most of human history has been first and foremost devoted to an attempt 
to discover the absolute truth, the unmodifiable and incontrovertible truth. 
The truth is absolute when it neither depends on one’s faith, or certainty of 
it, nor one’s hopes or fear that it is the way it is, rather when it is impossible 
that it would be any different from the way it is. Such an attempt, however, 
is no longer possible in a world in which no episteme is permanent. When an 
absolute truth is denied, the consequence is not, in turn, the absolute truth 
of the denial, rather the practical situation to organize existence without 
such absolute truth (about the world). It is a world in which no definitive 
and undeniable truth (about the world) is possible. The abandonment of 
the absolute truth (except the truth that nothing is forever) and the choice 
of the ‘becoming’ form the ontological space where the forms of Western 
civilization, with its social and political institutions, have already moved. 
Thus, ephemeral ontology, impermanent knowledge, and deniable truth, 
are ‘things’ which maintain themselves in a provisional equilibrium between 
being and non-being. But it is precisely because ‘things’ are thought of as 
provisional equilibrium between being and non-being that the project to 
dominate them, by producing and destroying things, acquires a radicalism 
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it never before possessed. In fact, ‘produce’ means ‘to make pass from 
non-being into being,’ that is, to produce reality, knowledge, and truth; ‘to 
destroy’ means ‘to make pass from being into non-being,’ that is, to destroy 
reality, knowledge, and truth. The philosophy of the last two centuries has 
removed the way of every obstacle to action. The triumph of becoming is 
the rejection of traditional thought – that is, of the epistemic-metaphys-
ical entities – and the termination of the immutables. The immutables, 
anticipating and controlling the becoming, de facto cancel the contingent 
character of the events. Making the immutables a form of knowledge no 
longer supported by truth and episteme, the philosophy of the last two 
centuries has made the realities of time and becoming self-evident and in 
need of no demonstration; consequently, philosophy opened the way to an 
unstoppable will of power. 
3.2. Power as Unlimited Power (Evil)
A simplified version of my argument in this section could be summarized 
as follows: the pervasive nihilism of a civilization embracing the unques-
tionable belief that ‘all things pass’ leaves humanity at the mercy of an 
unstoppable technological power. This section is also a theoretical inquiry 
into ethics, with particular attention to ethics against technological dom-
ination. Can ethics save humanity? 
This section benefits from the following assumptions in pursuing the 
inquiry: 1. ethics is a form of rationale; 2. ethics’ scope is to govern and 
orient action; and, 3. ethics aims to maintain the primacy of rationale over 
action. Can ethics govern and stabilize action, in the case that action is 
primarily technological progress and will of power? To put it differently, 
can ethics discipline action and control power in a situation of vertiginous 
technological advance that seems almost impossible to keep up with? 
I previously built the case that in a situation of vertiginous technological 
advancement, the proper order between reason and action is inverted; as 
a result, reason loses control over action and action becomes dominant over 
reason. I added that the nihilist substratum of the technological culture 
simply makes the becoming unstoppable. 
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It should be clear at this point that technological culture itself requires 
a definition. What is ‘technological culture,’ after all? It is the view of tech-
nology as a ‘project of transforming the world.’ Who does carry forward this 
project? The answer is, whoever understands technology as an end on its 
own. For brevity, it can be called a ‘technological apparatus,’ although more 
precisely an apparatus of technology, science, rational thought, physics, and 
mathematics. This is an apparatus interested in increasing the power of tech-
nology. In the previous dominant cultures – humanistic as well as scientific 
culture – humanist and scientific apparatus were interested in increasing 
‘mankind’ and ‘knowledge,’ respectively. These previous dominant cultures 
overlook the authentic meaning of the technology’s project. Those who still 
live and see reality through the lens of humanist and scientist cultures want 
to make use of technology to realize their objectives. In a technological 
culture, however, technology has a purpose different from ‘mankind’ or 
‘knowledge,’ that is, the indefinite increase of power. Science succeeded 
in giving mankind greater knowledge than humanism; like technology, 
science had a purpose different from ‘mankind.’ The same can happen with 
technology: although technology has a purpose different from ‘mankind,’ it 
can succeed in giving mankind greater power than humanism and science. 
With that said, technology does not take ‘mankind’ for an end in itself. 
In a technological culture, the purpose of technology is the indefinite 
increase of power, that is, the will of power. Technology, in fact, is the will 
of power. Precisely because technology is will of power, technology is, 
after all, a specific product of Western thought. In the words of Schelling, 
who summarizes in this way the entire experience of the West, “Wollen ist 
Ursein,” the will is the primordial Being. The will of power is the will to 
increase one’s power over things and gods: this has always been the most 
profound desire of people in the West who think that power allows them 
to overcome pain and death. Technology’s ultimate purpose is the purpose 
of the supreme form of the will to power. In other words, the purpose of 
technology is domination. Technology is destined to pursue its purpose 
without limitations or counterpowers because the essential substratum 
of the philosophy of the last two centuries has made crystal clear that the 
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only possible truth is the becoming. All comes and goes. All comes to life 
and passes away. Nothing is forever. If nothing is forever, no limits can be 
erected to block technology’s indefinite increase of power; in fact, if a limit 
is not forever, it is will be overcome one day or another. 
To put it differently, the project to dominate ‘things’ is the result of 
a specific understanding of the world as a place in which things are con-
tended, that is, in which being and nothing (or non-being) contend these 
things between each other. The project to dominate ‘things’ is the result 
of a specific understanding of the world as a place in which the contingent 
condition of things, their condition of non-necessity, is necessary in order 
for becoming to reign. If becoming is the supreme evidence, it cannot be 
suffocated by enduring ontology, permanent knowledge, and incontrovertible 
truth. The will for becoming to be survives any attempt to suffocate it; pre-
cisely for this reason, it is necessary for any enduring ontology, permanent 
knowledge, and incontrovertible truth, within which the becoming of the 
world is unthinkable, to vanish. Thus, will dominates it all. 
As said, the term ‘culture’ is used in a specific mode, synonymous with 
‘world-view.’ This world-view, in turn, is the result of a dynamic relationship 
between ethos and logos. Once this insight is applied to ‘technology’ and 
‘ethics,’ ‘technology’ stands for an orientation toward ethos, and ‘ethics’ 
toward logos. In this context, this study had advanced one claim: the shift 
from a scientific to a technological culture can be better understood as a shift 
of the relationship between logos and ethos within culture (a transformation 
of culture). In this section, a second claim is advanced: ethics is incapable 
of governing technology, and that is a consequence of that shift.  
It is clear, at this point, that no degree or quality of forms of ethics can 
reverse this trend. The very nature of action has changed into will of power, 
and action refuses to be constrained by the limits of reason. Thus, an ethos 
(action) of technological power without a logos that precedes it and gives it 
meaning is free to produce an action that is not simply morally wrong, but 
leaves no room for understanding or redemption (i.e., evil). In other words, 
in the technological culture, technology can be evil because the culture itself 
is tainted by will of dominion. The same logic can be extended to ethics: 
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forms of ethics that are developed to limit the effects of technological 
progress (i.e., AI self-empowerment) are ineffective if not subordinated to 
a rationale (logos), which, in turn, restrains the use of technological power 
and guides the appropriate exercise of such power. But in a technological 
culture, Guardini argues, practice is not subordinated to action. Thus, one 
can’t accept the rationale of technological progress and believe that one 
can restrain it with ethics.
In conclusion, in this section I showed the inadequacy of forms of ethics 
in limiting the self-empowering tendency of AI. In fact, the nominalist 
emphasis on superiority of will (voluntarism) in the age of AI has already 
established the primacy of ethos (action) over logos (rationale). No longer 
constrained in a rational framework, action is no longer morally answerable. 
As a result, an ethos of power divorced from responsibility is driven by 
a thirst for self-empowerment which can be boldly described as ‘demonic.’
Conclusion
I discussed the culture transformation – from scientific to technological 
culture – by adopting the categories of Guardini’s thought. A definition 
of culture is provided in terms of ethos (the embodiment of ideas in social 
practice) and logos (the rationale behind practice). Then I considered evil 
in the context of culture transformation, through a complex re-articulation 
of the ethos-logos relationship. The endgame of the reflection pursued 
throughout this article is that in a technological culture, evil emerges 
naturally as an inherent trait of power associated with technology. 
Acknowledges
I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this paper 
for providing insightful comments and directions for additional work, which 
has resulted in this improved version.
9(1)/2021280
E N R I CO B E LT RA M I N I
References
Arendt, Hannah. 1963. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New 
York: Viking Press.
Arkin, Ronald C. 2009. Governing lethal behavior in autonomous robots. Boca Raton: 
CRC Press.
Boddington, Paula. 2017. Towards a Code of Ethics for Artificial Intelligence. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Bostrom, Nick. 2002. “Existential Risks – Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and 
Related Hazards.” Journal of Evolution and Technology 9: 31–33.
Bostrom, Nick. 2014. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bowles, Cennydd. 2018. Future Ethics. N.d.: NowNext Press. 
Calder, Todd. 2015. “Evil Persons.” Criminal Justice Ethics 34(3): 350–360.
Card, Claudia. 2002. The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Cassirer, Ernst. 1985. Symbol, Technik, Sprache: Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1927–1933, ed-
ited by Ernst Wolfgang Orth & John Michael Krois. Hamburg: Meiner.
Coeckelbergh, Mark. 2020. AI Ethics. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Formosa, Paul. 2008. “A Conception of Evil.” Journal of Value Inquiry 42(2): 217–239. 
Guardini, Romano. 2001. The End of the Modern World, Trans. Joseph Theman and 
Herbert Burke. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books.
Guardini, Guardini. 1994. Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and 
the Human Race, Trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. 
Guardini, Romano 1993. Gläubiges Dasein: Die Annahme seiner selbst. Mainz: Mat-
thias-Grünewald-Verlag.
Gunkel, David J. 2012. The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and 
Ethics. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1968. Technik und Wissenschaft als “Ideologie”. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp.
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Die Technik und die Kehre. Pfullingen: Neske.
Haybron, Daniel. 2002. “Moral Monsters and Saints.” The Monist 85(2): 260–284.
Jaspers, Karl. 1931. Die geistige Situation der Zeit. Berlin & Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter 
& Co.
Kekes, John. 2005. The Roots of Evil. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Lin, Patrick, Jenkins, Ryan, and Abney Keith. 2017. Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous 
Cars to Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lin, Patrick and Abney, Keith. 2011. Robot Ethics and Social Implications of Robotics. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
9(1)/2021 281
T H E G OV E R N M E N T O F E V I L M AC H I N E S. . .
Martin, Brian. 2019. “Technology and Evil.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply 
Collective 8(2): 1–14.
Millare, Roland. 2016. “The Primacy of Logos Over Ethos: The Influence of Romano 
Guardini on Post-Conciliar Theology.” The Heythrop Journal 57(6): 974–983.
Pope Francis. 2015. Encyclical Letter Laudato Si, given in Rome at Saint Peter’s on 
May 24. 
Russell, Luke. 2014. Evil: A Philosophical Investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Russell, Stuart. 2019. Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of 
Control. New York: Vikings. 
Severino, Emanuele. 2016a. The Essence of Nihilism. London and New York: Verso.
Severino, Emanuele. 2016b. Nihilism and Destiny. Milan: Mimesis International. 
Rimbaud, Arthur. 1879. Une saison en enfer. Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade. The English translation is taken from Arthur Rimbaud, Complete Works, 
trans. Paul Schmidt (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), http://www.mag4.net/
Rimbaud/poesies/Farewell.html, accessed February 14, 2018.
Singer, Marcus G. 2004. “The Concept of Evil.” Philosophy 79(2): 185–21. 
Sparrow, Robert. 2007. “Killer Robots.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24(1): 62–77.
Sparrow, Robert. 2016. Robots as “Evil Means”? A Rejoinder to Jenkins and Purves. 
Ethics & International Affairs 30(3): 401–403. 
Spengler, Oswald. 1931. Der Mensch und die Technik: Beitrag zu einer Philosophie des 
Lebens. München: C.H. Beck.
Szollosy, Michael. 2017. “Freud, Frankenstein and our Fear of Robots: Projection in 
our Cultural Perception of Technology.” AI and Society 33(3): 433–43.
Steiner, Hillel. 2002. “Calibrating Evil.” The Monist 85(2): 183–193.
Tegmark, Max. 2017. Life 3.0. Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. New 
York: Knopt. 
von Balthasar, Hans Urs. 2010. Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source. San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press. 
Vinge, Vernor. 1993. The Coming Technological Singularity. How to Survive in the 
Post-Human Era. San Diego State Univ., San Diego, CA, United States. Pub-
lished on December 1, 1993. Available online at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.
jsp?R=19940022856. 
Wallach, Wendell and Allen, Colin. 2008. Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from 
Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Winner, Langdon. 1986. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of 
High Technology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
